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I. INTRODUCTION
Political parties have a place at the bedrock of Constitutional
rights and principles that are of the free and democratic foundation
of the United States. The formation of national political parties was
almost concurrent with the establishment of the Republic itself,1
with the right to associate with the political party of one's choice
being an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.2 But
*Ross D. Secler is an Associate Attorney at Odelson & Sterk, Ltd. who, prior
to joining Odelson & Sterk, represented the candidate in Rudd v. Lake County
Electoral Bd., 2016 IL App (2d) 160649. Burton S. Odelson is the founding
partner of Odelson & Sterk, Ltd. who represented the successful objectors in
Rudd and Cullerton v. Du Page County Officers Electoral Bd., 384 Ill. App. 3d
989 (2d Dist. 2008) and represented the Candidate in Hossfeld v. Illinois State
Bd. of Elections, 238 Ill. 2d 418 (2010). Both Ross and Burton represented the
candidate/petitioner in Patton v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 2018 IL App
(1st) 180425-U, appeal denied, stay denied, 123337, 2018 WL 1404289 (Ill. Mar.
13, 2018).
1. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000); see also Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) (stating that “[t]he
freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
includes partisan political organization.”).
2. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973); see also MADISON, THE
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what does it mean to be a “member of” or “affiliated with” a political
party?
It may seem like a simple question to answer, but it is one that
brings about many different thoughts, ideas, and subsequent
litigation. Whether they be thoughts of people cheering at rallies
and political conventions, proudly wearing their party’s buttons,
shirts, and other garb, or whether they be imagery of a more
insidious, ubiquitous pictures of Tammany Hall or notions of the
“smoke-filled room” where political party “insiders” secretly work
outside the view of “regular” people, the way to define political party
“affiliation” or “membership” is more complicated than it may seem
at first glance. In today’s fast-paced, ultra-connected world, the
direct allegiance to political parties versus to individuals (i.e.
Trump-Republicans or Obama-Democrats) is becoming increasingly
clear.
Because the Constitution grants to the States a broad power to
prescribe the “Times, Places, and Manner” for holding elections,
which power is massaged by state control over the election process
for state offices,3 how States define political party “affiliation”
affects the implementation of a State’s regulation of voters,
candidates, and the nomination process. These laws, governing who
may, and who may not, participate in the political party primary
election process, must strike a balance, to wit: the First and
Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to associate with the
political party of one’s choice,4 while States (and political parties)
have the “legitimate interest in curtailing ‘raiding’ by members of
opposing political parties, and preserving the integrity of the
electoral process.”5 The result leaves States with the ability to adopt
reasonable, tailored conditions to be imposed on the right to change
political parties.6 While the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly held
that States may regulate party-switching,7 there is no definitive
universal test to define political party affiliation in the first place.
What further complicates this issue is an increasing amount of
people declining to self-identify as members of either the

FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing the right to freely participate,
vote, and affiliate as political parties representing the principal check against
one part of society inflicting injustice on the other part).
3. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §4, cl. 1); Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008).
4. Kusper, 414 U.S. at 57.
5. Sperling v. Cnty. Officers Electoral Bd., 57 Ill. 2d 81, 84 (1974); Rosario
v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1973). “Party Raiding” is generally
described generally as the practice “whereby voters in sympathy with one party
designate themselves as voters of another party so as to influence or determine
the results of the other party's primary.” Rosario, 410 U.S. at 760-61.
6. Sperling, 57 Ill. 2d at 84; See also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732-33
(1974) (discussing and comparing outcomes in cases evaluating the
constitutionality of ballot access laws and party-switching restrictions).
7. Storer, 415 U.S. at 732-33.
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Democratic or Republican parties and instead identifying as
“independent,” often with a particular ideological leaning.8
Interestingly, while an increasing amount of people declare their
“independence” from political parties, in practice, most
“independents” still vote and act like their partisan counterparts.9
Thus, while States and political parties assert their rights to an
orderly and defined electoral and nomination process, adopting
large-scale or universal formulae to judge individual political party
affiliation is, at best, difficult and unlikely to reflect the true
intentions of individual participants in the electoral process.
The difficulty of making the determination to define individual
political party affiliations has led to states implementing differing
legislative schemes to administer elections and the nomination
processes of political parties with varying degrees of “openness” as
to the qualifications for voters, candidates, and petition signers who
participate in the political party nomination process.10 The ad hoc
8. Party Affiliation, GALLUP, www.news.gallup.com/poll/15370/partyaffiliation.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2018); see also A Deep Dive Into Party
Affiliation, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2015), www.people-press.org/2015/04/07/adeep-dive-into-party-affiliation/#party-id-by-generation (finding that the “the
biggest change in partisan affiliation in recent years is the growing share of
Americans who decline to affiliate with either party . . . The rise in the share of
independents has been particularly dramatic over the past decade). This trend
was apparently recognized by the dissent in one of the seminal cases recognizing
the prevention of “party raiding” as a legitimate interest. See Rosario, 410 U.S.
at 771 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining, in dissent, that “[p]artisan political
activities do not constantly engage the attention of large numbers of Americans,
especially as party labels and loyalties tend to be less persuasive than issues
and the qualities of individual candidates. The crossover in registration from
one party to another is most often impelled by motives is most often impelled
by motives quite unrelated to a desire to raid or distort a party's primary.”).
9. See Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR. app. B
(Why We Include Leaners With Partisans) (June 12, 2014), www.peoplepress.org/2014/06/12/appendix-b-why-we-include-leaners-with-partisans/
(showing the trends between declared political party preference and actual voting
practices); see also John Sides, Most Political Independents Actually Aren’t, WASH.
POST
(Jan.
8,
2014),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2014/01/08/most-political-independents-actuallyarent/?utm_term=.49f99492e0e4 (discussing the decline of “pure” independent
voters despite data showing increased “independent” political affiliation); Alan
Abramowitz, The Partisans in the Closet: Political Independents Are (Mostly) a
Figment of Your Imagination, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2014), www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2014/01/independent-voters-partisans-in-the-closet101931#.U4ZIAfldUsP (asserting that most individuals who identify as
“independent” tend to support only one political party’s candidates).
10. Compare Rosario, 410 U.S. at 753 (illustrating the “Closed Primary”
systems of New York whereby only enrolled, registered members of a political
party may vote in that party’s primary), with Primary Elections in California,
CAL. SECRETARY OF ST., www.sos.ca.gov/elections/primary-elections-california/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (discussing California’s use of the “Open” or “TopTwo” primary system titled “Top Two Candidates Open Primary Act”); see also
State Primary Election Systems, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 2016),
www.ncsl.org/documents/Elections/Primary_Types_Table_2017.pdf
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evaluation of these different systems has produced a wide array of
legal and practical opinions.11
Illinois presents perhaps the most interesting case and
litigation history, whereby the previous legislative structure
defining party affiliation and restrictions to party-switching was
ruled unconstitutional.12 Subsequent legislative and judicial actions
(or inactions) have thus produced a political system that actually
enables political gamesmanship that promotes coordinated “party
raiding” on others while imposing steep impediments to individuals
seeking to participate in the political process with the party of their
choice. No case better represents the dysfunction of the current law
in Illinois, as it relates to defining and regulating political party
affiliation, than Patton v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections.13
While a bit unorthodox to devote an entire analysis to a nonprecedential case,14 the Patton legacy demonstrates the incongruity
between the law and political reality.15 It now appears that Illinois
falls into a sort of middle-ground, a semi-open primary system
whereby party-affiliation is defined as one who is a “qualified
primary voter” of a given political party.16 Under current Illinois
law, voters do not have to register their party affiliation prior to
voting but must choose which party's ballot they will vote in the
primary, and whichever ballot they choose is a matter of public

(summarizing the primary election and affiliation requirement schemes for
state, local, and congressional elections); A Primer on Primaries, 20 THE
CANVASS: STATES AND ELECTION REFORM NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, May
2011, www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/elect/Canvass_May_2011_No_20.pdf,
(describing different types of primary elections conducted in various states).
11. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., It's My Party and I'll Do What I Want to:
Political Parties, Unconstitutional Conditions, and the Freedom of Association,
12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 65, 66 (2013) (discussing, in particular, the US
Supreme Court’s “ad hoc approach” to the developing doctrine of evaluating
laws regulating states, political parties, and political party affiliation).
12. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973) (holding unconstitutional
the 23-month “lockout” rule on voters switching party-affiliation found in
Section 7-43(d) of the Illinois Election Code); see also Sperling v. Cty. Officers
Electoral Bd., 57 Ill.2d 81, 86 (1974) (holding that the two-year party-switching
restrictions within Section 7-10 of the Illinois Election Code were unenforceable
as to voters, petition signers, and candidates).
13. Patton v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U.
14. Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U was decided by the Illinois Appellate
Court under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b). The unusual appellate court
order dismissing the original appeal, 2018 IL App. (1st) 18022-U is noteworthy,
but not pertinent to the discussion herein. Nor is the Illinois Supreme Court’s
initial intervention to order a stay of the candidate’s removal from the ballot
and for the appellate court to expedite consideration of the appeal, followed by
denial of the petition for leave to appeal.
15. It may also seem odd to highlight and discuss a case in which the authors
lost.
16. Cullerton v. Du Page Cty. Officers Electoral Bd., 384 Ill. App. 3d 989,
996 (2d Dist. 2008) (discussing the history of Illinois primary party-switching
restrictions).
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record.17 But vestiges of previous statutory sections mixed with
judicial decisions stand as further, more complicated restrictions on
party-switching and affiliation as applied to voters, candidates, and
petition signers.
We are now left with Patton, where the candidate, a lifelong,
unflinching Republican,18 was removed from the primary election
ballot and was forced to seek election at the General Election under
a “new” political party label, the “Downstate United” party.19
This article examines the evolution of “party-switching” and
party affiliation law in Illinois and the implications of the current
state of party affiliation restrictions, as seen through the outcome
of the Patton case. Ultimately, what may seem like a simple
question–that of one’s political party affiliation–has caused
significant litigation and uncertainty among voters, candidates, and
attorneys alike. In Illinois, without curative legislative action, we
are left with a system of defining political party affiliation that
contains serious issues ripe with opportunities for “gotcha games”
to deny ballot access or voting rights, which has given rise to forms
of political gamesmanship. This “legal political” maneuvering is the
reverse of so-called “party-raiding,” whereby opposing political
parties utilize ballot access objections and litigation to try and
prevent voters of another political party from nominating the
candidate of their choosing.

II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Illinois Party Affiliation & PartySwitching Laws
In Illinois determining who is entitled to participate in a given
political party’s nomination process is generally defined by meeting

17. See Rudd v. Lake Cty. Electoral Bd., 2016 IL App (2d) 160649, ¶ 3
(explaining how “Illinois has an open primary system, which means that voters
do not have to register with their party affiliation and may vote in either party's
primary. Voters, however, must choose which party's ballot they will vote in the
primary, and whichever ballot they choose is a matter of public record because
it is considered a declaration of the voter's current party affiliation”); see also
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 68 (1973) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (discussing
the interplay of Section 7-43, 7-44, and 7-45 of the Illinois Election Code and
the emphasis on a primary voter’s declaration of party affiliation at the primary
election itself).
18. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U
[hereinafter Brief of Petitioner-Appellant].
19. Joseph Bustos, Hal Patton Files to Run for State Senate as Third-Party
Candidate, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (June 25, 2018, 4:59 PM),
www.bnd.com/news/local/article213791039.html; Kelsey Landis, No one
objected to his candidacy, so Edwardsville mayor will be on the ballot,
BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (July 3, 2018, 9:36 AM), www.bnd.com/
news/local/article214253739.html.
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the requirements of a “qualified primary voter” or “qualified
primary elector”20 as used in Articles 721 and 822 of the Illinois
Election Code.23
Illinois once had a statutory 23-month “lock-in” rule that
defined acts of political party affiliation and restricted partyswitching by voters, candidates, and signers of nominating
petitions.24 Essentially, these restrictions prohibited participation
in another political party’s primary if a person had participated in
a different political party’s primary within two years.25 However, in
contrast with the past iterations of the Illinois Election Code, as it
stands today, there is no explicit definition of “qualified primary
voter” remaining in the statute.26
How Illinois’s party-switching and affiliation law has evolved
since 1970 is due both to judicial determination and legislative
action and/or reaction.27 As shown in Table 1,28 the relevant
portions of the Illinois Election Code defining what constitutes
party affiliation have been cut while vestiges of party-switching
restrictions remain.
In summary, where the Illinois Election Code once had detailed
specific requirements and definitions for “qualified primary
electors” as applied to party-switching restrictions for voters,
petition signers, and for candidates, the Code now provides that: (i)
a candidate must file, as part of their nominating petitions, a
Statement of Candidacy attesting that he or she is a “qualified
20. As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Hossfeld v. Ill. State Bd. of
Elections, the phrase “qualified primary elector” and “qualified primary voter”
have the same meaning. Hossfeld v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 288 Ill. 2d 418,
Fn 3 (2010) (citing Sperling, 57 Ill.2d at 83).
21. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-1, et seq. (2018).
22. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-1, et seq. (2018).
23. Further, pursuant to Section 8-15 of the Illinois Election Code, unless
express provided otherwise within Article 8, the provisions of Article 7 apply to
govern primary elections and contests thereof under Article 8. 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/8-15 (2018).
24. See P.A. 89-331, § 3, eff. Aug. 17, 1995 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-43 (2018)) (showing the explicit restriction barring the right to vote at
a primary where either (i) the person signed the nominating petition of a
candidate of a different political party or of an independent candidate, (ii) the
person participated in a different political party’s township caucus, or (iii) the
person votes at the primary of a different political party within a period of 23
calendar months preceding the calendar month in which the primary is held);
P.A. 86-786, § 5, eff. Sept. 6, 1989 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/710 (2018)) (containing the definition of “qualified primary elector” of a political
party “for purposes of determining eligibility to sign a petition for nomination
or eligibility to be a candidate” under Article 7 of the Election Code, which
included the two year party-switching restriction as applied to petition signers
and candidates).
25. See Cullerton, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 992 (discussing the history of Illinois
primary party-switching restrictions).
26. Hossfeld, 238 Ill.2d at 427; Cullerton, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 995.
27. See Appendix A.
28. See Appendix A.
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primary voter” of the political party for which nomination is
sought;29 (ii) “a ‘qualified primary elector’ of a party may not sign
petitions for or be a candidate in the primary of more than one
party;”30 and (iii) a person who either files a statement of candidacy
as a candidate of one party at a primary, or who votes the primary
ballot of one party, cannot file a statement of candidacy as a
candidate of a different established political party (or as an
independent) at the general election immediately following that
general primary.31 Notably, absent from the Illinois Election Code
is a definition of “qualified primary voter” of a given political party,
which gives rise to the litigation eventually bringing about Patton.
As discussed herein, the aftermath of two cases (Kusper and
Sperling), which found certain portions of party-switching
restrictions in the Election Code to be unconstitutional, increased
the ambiguity with the applicable, remaining portions of the
Election Code, which, eventually, set the stage for new judicial
applications of party-switching restrictions. What follows traces the
judicial and legislative history of this area of law that, ultimately,
leads to the absurd result and effect of the Patton case and reveals
the legislative “holes” in need of General Assembly repair.

B. The Effect of Kusper and Sperling
The Illinois Election Code once had a specific definition of
“qualified primary elector” within Section 7-10 (and mirrored in
Section 8-8), which also restricted voting, signing petitions, or
seeking nomination as a candidate of more than one political party
within a 23-month period.32 However, in 1973 the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Kusper v. Pontikes33 set in motion the progeny of
cases evaluating the Freedom of Association with Illinois partyswitching restrictions. In Kusper, the Court struck down the 23month “lockout” rule found in Section 7-43(d) of the Illinois Election
Code that applied to voters.34 The Court reasoned that the 23-month

29. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-10 (2018).
30. Id.; see also Hossfeld, 238 Ill.2d at 427, 429 (explaining the legislative
history of the party-switching restrictions applicable to signers of nominating
petitions and what language the current version of the statute still contains).
31. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-43 (2018); Table 1, supra note 97. Note that there
is no prohibition against filing as a “new political party” candidate, which
allowed the candidate in Patton to eventually do so after courts determined that
he was not a qualified Republican.
32. See P.A. 89-331, § 3, eff. Aug. 17, 1995 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-43 (2018)) addressing previous restrictions applicable to primary
voters); P.A. 86-786, § 5, eff. Sept. 6, 1989 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-10 (2018)) (containing a definition of “qualified primary voter” and
party-switching restrictions for petition signers and those who sought to become
political party candidates).
33. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
34. Id. at 61.
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restriction “substantially restricts an Illinois voter’s freedom to
change his political party affiliation” because, “[o]ne who wishes to
change his party registration must wait almost two years before his
choice will be given effect . . . . [and] he is forced to forgo
participation in any primary elections occurring within the
statutory 23-month hiatus.”35 Ultimately, because the Court found
that the restriction had the effect “to ‘lock’ the voter into his preexisting party affiliation for a substantial period of time following
participation in any primary election, and each succeeding primary
vote extends this period of confinement,”36 and because the
legislative goal could be attained by a far less substantial and
unnecessary burden, the 23-month “lockout” restriction applying to
voters was held unconstitutional.37
Kusper was soon followed, and expanded upon, by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Sperling v. County Officers Electoral Bd.,38
whereby the two-year party-switching restrictions that were within
Section 7-10 of the Illinois Election Code were found to be
unconstitutional and unenforceable.39 The court first held that the
absolute, 23-month restriction on those voters who wish to sign
primary nominating petitions was invalid under Kusper.40 Further,
the court held that the two-year party-switching restrictions
applicable to candidates was also unenforceable because the
restrictions on voters and petition signers were so intertwined that
each “cannot be considered independent and severable from the
invalid portions of the [statute].”41
The immediate result after Kusper and Sperling, before any
“curative” legislation, was to render inoperable those restrictions
upon candidates in a party primary, and voters who signed
nominating petitions, concerning those individuals' prior political
affiliations.42 Thus, until about 1990,43 there were no enforceable
“party-switching” or affiliation restrictions to prevent voters,
candidates, or petition signers form changing party allegiance from
primary election to primary election.
35. Id. at 57.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 61 (discussing and distinguishing the Court’s decision and reasoning
for the New York Case, Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973)).
38. Sperling v. Cty. Officers Electoral Bd., 57 Ill. 2d 81 (1974).
39. Id. at 86.
40. Id. at 84.
41. Id. at 86.
42. Dooley v. McGillicudy, 63 Ill. 2d 54, 60 (1976).
43. See P.A. 86-1348, § 2, eff. Sept. 7, 1990 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-10 (2018)) (formally removing the two year party-switching restriction
for candidates and petition signers), discussed infra note 102. But c.f. Watkins
v. Burke, 122 Ill. App. 3d 499, 502 (1st Dist. 1984) (finding pursuant to the pre1990 changes to Section 7-10 that when “an otherwise qualified voter has signed
the nominating petitions of more than one party, the signature appearing on
the petition first signed is valid and all subsequent signatures appearing on the
nominating petitions of other parties are invalid”).
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C. Interim Legislative Changes
The legislative response to Kusper and Sperling came two-fold.
First, the General Assembly in 1990 struck the definition of
“qualified primary voter,” as used to define “eligibility” for both
petition signers and potential candidates, from both Sections 7-10
and 8-8 of the Illinois Election Code.44
While both these enactments seemed to eliminate any “vestige
of the former party-switching rule” from the statute,45 the Code
retained the requirement that candidates seeking the nomination
of an established party must file a Statement of Candidacy wherein
the candidate swears that he or she is a “qualified primary voter of
the party to which the nomination petition relates.”46 This is where
the problem began for Patton (and others similarly situated). The
definition of “qualified primary voter” having been eliminated from
the statute along with explicit party-switching restrictions being
deleted, the Statement of Candidacy requirements and the
restriction on “qualified primary voters” from signing different
political party nominating petitions, or from being a candidate for
multiple parties at the same primary election, seemingly remained.
The result led to judicial interpretations that appear to now
prescribe “new” party-switching and affiliation restrictions not
apparent in Illinois law.

D. “Qualified Primary Voters” and Candidate PartySwitching Reborn: The Cases of Cullerton &
Hossfeld
With the retained Statement of Candidacy language requiring
that a candidate swear to be a “qualified primary voter” of a political
party, the litigation testing new (or remaining) Illinois statutory
party-switching restrictions post-Kusper and Sperling, as applied to
candidates, came about in Cullerton and then Hossfeld.
In Cullerton, the Illinois Appellate Court considered the
eligibility of a candidate who attempted to be a Democratic Party
candidate at the General Election47 despite voting a Republican
Party ballot at the preceding General Primary Election.48 The
Appellate Court reasoned that the requirement that a candidate be
a “qualified primary voter of the party for which he seeks a
nomination” mandates, “if nothing else, that the candidate [must]
44. See Appendix B.
45. Hossfeld, 238 Ill.2d at 428.
46. Id.
47. The candidate had been selected to fill a vacancy in nomination.
Cullerton, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 990.
48. Id.
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have been eligible to vote in the primary for that party in the most
recent primary election preceding the candidate's filing the
statement of candidacy.”49 The court held that, “the limitation on
candidate party-switching found in the statement-of-candidacy
portion of section 7-10 of the Code, which requires that a candidate
attest to being a ‘qualified primary voter’ of the party whose
nomination the candidate seeks, is now viable even in light of
Sperling.”50
Thus, Cullerton interpreted a rule that a candidate who voted
in one party’s primary election could not then be a different political
party’s nominee at the next, following general election. Cullerton
marked the first of the “party-switching” cases that defines who
can–and who cannot switch parties, and during what certain time
period (without any particular statute explicitly providing for
same).
Following Cullerton, our Supreme Court handed down a
unanimous decision in Hossfeld v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections,51
wherein a candidate voted in the Democratic Party, Consolidated
Primary Election, voted in the April Consolidated (“general”)
Election, and then filed as a Republican Party candidate at the next
General Primary Election.52 In concluding that the candidate had
not violated any party-switching restrictions, the Illinois Supreme
Court found that “the Election Code no longer contains express time
limitations on party-switching, and [the candidate] did not run
afoul of the only remaining restriction, set forth in both sections 7–
10 and 8–8, that a ‘qualified primary elector’ of a party may not sign
petitions for or be a candidate in the primary of more than one
party.”53 The court in Hossfeld adopted a temporal rule limiting
candidate party-switching within an “election cycle” (i.e. from the
primary until the subsequent general election).54
Thus, under Cullerton and Hossfeld, a petition signer, a
candidate, and a voter may change his political affiliation from one
election cycle to another, similar to the temporal restrictions
previously ruled upon by Kusper and Sperling. The problem with
Cullerton and Hossfeld is that the temporal party-switching
restrictions were not explicitly legislatively mandated and were not
in the Illinois Election Code.
This “legislative hole” was seemingly closed in 2012 when the
General Assembly codified the remaining party-switching
restrictions, in light of the Hossfeld holding,55 to determine who is

49. Id. at 996.
50. Id. at 997.
51. Hossfeld v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 238 Ill.2d 418 (2010).
52. Id. at 421-22.
53. Id. at 429.
54. Id.
55. See P.A. 97-681, § 5, eff. March 30, 2012 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-43 (2018)), State of Illinois, 97th Gen. Assembly, H.R. Transcription
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a “qualified primary voter” when it passed Public Act 97-0681,
which modified Section 7-43 of the Illinois Election Code to read:
§7-43. Every person having resided in this State 6 months and in the
precinct 30 days next preceding any primary therein who shall be a
citizen of the United States of the age of 18 or more years shall be
entitled to vote at such primary.
The following regulations shall be applicable to primaries:
No person shall be entitled to vote at a primary:
(a) Unless he declares his party affiliations as required by this Article.
(b) (Blank.)
(c) (Blank.)
(c.5) If that person has participated in the town political party caucus,
under Section 45–50 of the Township Code, of another political party
by signing an affidavit of voters attending the caucus within 45 days
before the first day of the calendar month in which the primary is
held.
(d) (Blank.)
(e) In cities, villages and incorporated towns having a board of
election commissioners only voters registered as provided by Article
6 of this Act shall be entitled to vote at such primary.
(f) No person shall be entitled to vote at a primary unless he is
registered under the provisions of Articles 4, 5 or 6 of this Act, when
his registration is required by any of said Articles to entitle him to
vote at the election with reference to which the primary is held.
A person (i) who filed a statement of candidacy for a partisan office
as a qualified primary voter of an established political party or (ii)
who voted the ballot of an established political party at a general
primary election may not file a statement of candidacy as a candidate
of a different established political party or as an independent
candidate for a partisan office to be filled at the general election
immediately following the general primary for which the person filed
the statement or voted the ballot. A person may file a statement of
candidacy for a partisan office as a qualified primary voter of an
established political party regardless of any prior filing of candidacy
for a partisan office or voting the ballot of an established political
party at any prior election.56

Public Act 97-0681’s amendment to Section 7-43 treats the act
of filing a Statement of Candidacy as tantamount to taking a
primary ballot and considers both interchangeable acts as the
“commitment from the candidate as to what Party they want to be

Deb., 31st Legislative Day, at 95, 102 (Mar. 29, 2011), available at
www.ilga.gov/House/transcripts/Htrans97/09700031.pdf
(noting,
during
legislative debate, that the law was being updated to clarify and codify a court
ruling).
56. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-43 (2018).
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associated with for that one election cycle.”57 Notably, Section 7-43
still contains no mention of signing nominating petitions and, it
would seem, does not place a restriction against “filing a statement
of candidacy” if you have signed nominating petitions of a different
political party.
Instead, the new language in Section 7-43 specifically includes
the sentence that, “[a] person may file a statement of candidacy for
a partisan office as a qualified primary voter of an established
political party regardless of any prior filing of candidacy for a
partisan office or voting the ballot of an established political party
at any prior election.”58 Clearly, the inclusion of this portion further
solidifies an intended connection between “voting” and “filing” (a
Statement of Candidacy) as the determinative acts that define a
“qualified primary voter” and political party “affiliation” for
purposes of the Illinois Election Code. These two types of sworn
public declarations as matters of public record are not able to be
“withdrawn,”59 and by tying both within a definition of who is
“qualified” to vote at a primary election it would seem to settle a
new definition for “qualified primary voter.”
Nevertheless, while the General Assembly seemed to re-codify
and define what constitutes a “qualified primary voter,” after
Hossfeld there have been different judicial interpretations dealing
with other “vestiges”60 of party-switching restrictions that remained
in the Illinois Election Code. The 2012 revision to Section 7-43 of
the Election Code should have settled these matters, but that
ultimately has not been the case.

57. P.A. 97-681, § 5, eff. March 30, 2012 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-43 (2018)), State of Illinois, 97th Gen. Assembly, H.R. Transcription
Deb., 31st Legislative Day, at 98-99 (Mar. 29, 2011) (statements by
Representative Fortner), available at www.ilga.gov/House/transcripts/
Htrans97/09700031.pdf (last visited on Feb. 10, 2019).
58. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-43 (2018) (emphasis added).
59. See Rudd v. Lake Cty. Electoral Bd., 2016 IL App (2d) 160649 at ¶¶ 1112 (finding that “[t]he fact of [the candidate’s] earlier established-party
candidacy in this election cycle simply is not [the candidate’s to ‘take back.’ Once
[the candidate] filed his nominating papers, his sworn statement of candidacy
and his sworn statement of party affiliation were matters of public record,
precisely because Rudd had publicly expressed them. . . That [the candidate]
withdrew from and ultimately did not vote in the March 2016 primary is of no
significance under section 7–43.”).
60. Ironically, in Hossfeld, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed how the
General Assembly eliminated any “vestige of the former party-switching rule”
from the statute. Hossfeld, 238 Ill.2d at 427-28; see also Michael J. Kasper, It's
My Party and I'll Run If I Want to: Party-Switching & Candidate Eligibility in
Light of Hossfeld v. State Bd. of Elections, 35 S. ILL. U.L.J. 249, 260-61 (2011)
(discussing the effective difference and problematic language used by the courts
in both Cullerton and Hossfeld and confusion it may leave).
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E. Vestiges of Candidate & Petition Signer PartySwitching Restrictions in § 7-10 and §8-8 of the
Election Code
While Cullerton and Hossfeld dealt primarily with a
candidate’s past voting conduct as determinative of the candidate’s
party-affiliation, since Public Act 86-1348 there remained the
following sentence in both Section 7-10 and Section 8-8 of the
Election Code: “A ‘qualified primary elector’ of a party may not sign
petitions for or be a candidate in the primary of more than one
party.”61 As such, a branch of cases has developed that have
diverged from cases (and statute) that tie party affiliation to voting
or filing a statement of candidacy. Instead, these cases examine the
effect of signing a nominating petition and thus declare one’s party
affiliation in order to be able to stand as a candidate for nomination
of a given political party. This ultimately led to the removal of
candidate Patton, a lifelong Republican, from the Republican Party
primary ballot.
During the pendency of Hossfeld, the Illinois Appellate Court
examined a case where a candidate who, prior to becoming a
candidate herself, signed the nominating petitions of the opposite
party’s candidate running for the same office.62 The court in
Rosenzweig noted specifically the “egregious example” of partyraiding violations and “political maneuvering” committed by the
candidate.63 Ultimately, the court in Rosenzweig extended Watkins
v. Burke64 and Section 7-10 (or 8-8) of the Election Code to find the
candidacy invalid where the candidate first signed the nominating
petitions of a candidate running for the nomination of a different
political party for the same office.65 In rejecting an argument that
the restrictions to signing different party petitions and running as
a candidate for different parties should be treated separately, the
court held that “the remaining restriction in section 8–8 of the
Election Code prohibits signing a nominating petition for a
candidate from one political party and then running as a candidate
for another political party in the same election cycle.”66
Rosenzweig was decided before the enactment of Public Act 9761. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-10 (2018); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-8 (2018).
62. Rosenzweig v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 409 Ill. App. 3d 176, 181 (1st
Dist. 2011).
63. Id.
64. Watkins v. Burke, 122 Ill. App. 3d 499, 502 (1st Dist. 1984) (analyzing
Section 7-10 of the Illinois Election Code with a definition of “qualified primary
voter” before the 1990 Amendments discussed above, found that when, “an
otherwise qualified voter has signed the nominating petitions of more than one
party, the signature appearing on the petition first signed is valid and all
subsequent signatures appearing on the nominating petitions of other parties
are invalid”).
65. Rosenzweig, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 181.
66. Id.
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0681. Hence, the General Assembly amended and specified
qualifications for primary voters in Section 7-43 of the Illinois
Election Code, which made no mention of the effect of signing a
nominating petition on one’s status as a “qualified primary voter” of
a given political party.67 Nonetheless, the holding of Rosenzweig and
the expansion of its rule was extended in Schmidt v. Illinois State
Bd. of Elections.68
In Schmidt, a candidate signed a nominating petition on behalf
of a candidate seeking the nomination of a different political party
but had signed a candidate of her own party’s petition first.69 While
the court in Schmidt held that the candidacy was valid, the court,
in dicta, stated that the petition-signing sequencing holding of
Watkins (extended by Rosenzweig) could apply beyond “only voter
signatures” and to the “signatures of a candidate for office.”70
Neither the court in Schmidt nor the court in Rosenzweig mentioned
that the ordered petition signing “rule” of Watkins was intended to
avoid the “draconian sanction” of disqualifying a voter’s signature
from all nominating petitions if she or she inadvertently signed for
different political parties.71
While the outcome in Schmidt was opposite of that in
Rosenzweig, Schmidt tends to further the reasoning and holding of
Rosenzweig and the “rule” that a potential candidate who signs a
nominating petition of one political party (for whatever office) is
barred from seeking nomination as a candidate of a different
political party (for whatever office). The court did not reflect upon
Public Act 97-0681 or the term “qualified primary elector” as it is
used in Section 7-10 (or 8-8) of the Illinois Election Code and it even
recognized that the “Election Code is silent as to the consequences”
of violating the restriction in Section 8-8 of the Election Code
against signing petitions or being a candidate in the primary of
more than on party.72 But no restraint was placed on its ultimate
holding.
Instead, beyond the plain language of the Election Code, there
now seems to be a “court-legislated” rule about the sequence of

67. See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-43 (2018); c.f. P.A. 95-699, § 5, eff. Nov. 9,
2007 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-43 (2018)) (deleting any
reference to signing nominating petitions and the effect on one’s qualification to
vote in a given primary election).
68. Schmidt v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL App (4th) 160189.
69. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. The court went into lengthy discussion to distinguish
Rosenzweig and the “egregious” political maneuvering in that case versus the
case presented in Schmidt. Id. at ¶ 24.
70. Id. at ¶ 25.
71. Watkins, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 502.
72. Schmidt, at ¶ 17. C.f. McNamara v. Oak Lawn Mun. Officers Electoral
Bd., 356 Ill. App. 3d 961, 967 (1st Dist. 2005) (holding where the Election Code
was silent as to the remedy or effect of violating a specific provision, “[w]e will
not read a remedy into a statute that fails to provide for one, particularly a
drastic remedy that deprives a citizen of the right to run for office.”).
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signing nominating petitions and the ability, through petition
objection litigation, to invalidate an entire candidacy.
Enter Patton. Where one signature on a nominating petition
circulated by the candidate’s old friend and dental patient was
enough to invalidate a lifetime of clear connection and affiliation
with one political party.

III. PATTON V. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS &
THE CURRENT STATE OF PARTY-AFFILIATION
REQUIREMENTS
After Public Act 97-0681, Hossfeld, and Cullerton, there was a
new interpretation of the meaning of who is a “qualified primary
voter” of a given political party and what party-switching
restrictions exist based on voting in a party’s primary or filing a
statement of candidacy as a candidate for nomination of a political
party. Additionally, and despite the interpretation of what
“qualified primary voter” means, under Rosenzweig and Schmidt
signing nominating petitions of one party can affect the entire
candidacy of a candidate for nomination of another political party.
The result of these two lines of cases, and the problems with how
Section 7-10 and Section 8-8 have been interpreted, are seen in the
outcome of Patton.73
Patton involved a case where the candidate, who currently
serves as a Mayor of the City of Edwardsville, sought the
Republican Party nomination for the office of State Senator.74 The
candidate had previously served as a Republican Party precinct
committeeman, ran (and served) as a Republican Party county
board member, voted a Republican Party ballot in the 2000, 2002,
2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, and most recent 2016 General Primary
Elections, and is active in his local Republican Party committee
organization.75
Before the candidate filed his state senate petitions as a
candidate for nomination of the Republican Party, he signed the
nominating petitions for a candidate (the incumbent) for state
representative, who was seeking the Democratic Party’s
nomination.76 The state representative candidate, and her entire
family, were long-time family friends and dental patients of Dr.
Patton, the candidate.77 When presented with a nominating petition
by the state representative’s mother-in-law, Dr. Patton signed it.78
The initial challenge to the Patton candidacy was heard by the
73. Patton v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U.
74. Id. at ¶ 2; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 18, at 5.
75. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 18, at 6.
76. Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U, ¶4; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant,
supra note 18, at 6.
77. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 18, at 6.
78. Id.

764

The John Marshall Law Review

[51:749

Illinois State Board of Elections sitting ex officio as the State
Officers Electoral Board.79 The Board voted along partisan lines,
four votes in favor of sustaining the objection to four votes in favor
of overruling the objection and, thus, the candidate’s name was
initially on the ballot.80 On judicial review in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, the candidacy was invalidated and, after various
procedural obscurities,81 the appellate court ultimately affirmed. 82
The appellate court held that (i) Dr. Patton was not a qualified,
affiliated, member of the Republican Party because he signed a
nominating petition for a long-time friend and dental patient who
is seeking the nomination of a different office in the Democratic
Party primary; and (ii) the following language, and vestige of
unconstitutional party-switching restrictions, from Section 8-8 of
the Election Code compels removal of the candidate from the
Republican Party primary ballot: “A ‘qualified primary elector’ of a
party may not sign petitions for or be a candidate in the primary of
more than one party”83.84
The appellate court did not address the issue of Dr. Patton’s
political history and his eligibility as a Republican Party “qualified
primary voter” pursuant to Section 7-43 of the Election Code,85 as
amended by Public Act 97-0681.86 In fact, while the appeal was
pending, the candidate voted early in the General Primary Election
and was unchallenged when he requested a Republican Party
ballot.87 Hence, by the plainest definition the candidate was a
“qualified primary voter” of the political party for which nomination
is sought, which is exactly what the candidate was required to

79. See Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U, ¶5; see 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/109 (2018) (describing how the State Officers Electoral Board hears objections to
petitions for candidates seeking nomination in Legislative Districts
encompassing more than one county).
80. Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U, ¶6; see Cook Cty. Republican Party
v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231, 241 (2009) (discussing the authority
to pursue judicial review even if the administrative board failed to reach a
decision by majority vote).
81. See Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180222-U, ¶ 19 (deciding that not all issues
had been resolved before the circuit court and, after being ordered to expedite
the appeal by the Illinois Supreme Court, dismissed the initial appeal).
82. Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U, ¶ 33. The Illinois Supreme Court
declined the candidates Petition for Leave to Appeal, as did the U.S. Supreme
Court with the candidate’s emergency application for stay. Leave to Appeal,
Patton, Il. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 123337, 2018 WL 1404289 (Ill. Mar. 13, 2018).
83. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-8 (2018).
84. Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U, ¶¶ 21, 23.
85. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-43 (2018).
86. See generally, Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U (discussing the
relevant language in Section 8-8 of the Election Code, but at no point evaluating
the arguments regarding Section 7-43 or the candidate’s voting and political
affiliation history, which were argued at length before the electoral board and
circuit court).
87. Petition for Leave to Appeal at 2, Patton, 2018 IL App (1st) 180425-U.
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swear to in his Statement of Candidacy.88
Thus, based on the Patton case Illinois law currently requires
that candidates for nomination of a political party be “qualified
primary electors” of the political party for which nomination is
sought. But independently, a candidacy can be invalidated for one
unverified signature on a friend and patient’s nominating petition
despite an otherwise unblemished history of “affiliation” with only
one political party.
The irony is that lifelong Republican candidate Patton is
seeking election after forced to form a “new political party” and
undergo the significantly increased cost and effort required to gain
access to the ballot.89 The appellate court decided the candidate was
not a “Republican,” even though he does not and never has,
affiliated with the Democratic Party.90 Thus, the law now
essentially forces candidates, like the one in Patton, to “affiliate”
with some new or pseudo political organization.91 The real result,
as it stands, is to stymie political participation and more congenial
political interactions with what boiled down to a “gotcha game.”
The objection to Republican Patton, backed by the opposing
political organization, utilized the petition objection process to
“raid” or otherwise disrupt the primary election for the other
political party. Had candidate Patton not had the resources to
pursue a new party candidacy, the Democratic Party candidate
88. See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-8 (2018) (requiring established party
candidates seeking the nomination for members of the Illinois General
Assembly to file a statement of candidacy as part of their nominating petitions
wherein the candidate must swear that he or she is a “qualified primary voter
of the party to which the petition relates”); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-10 (2018)
(requiring all established party candidates to file a statement of candidacy as
part of their nominating petitions wherein the candidate must swear that he or
she is a “qualified primary voter of the party to which the petition relates.”).
89. See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-2 (2018) (detailing the signature and
petition requirements for new political party candidates). Also noteworthy is
that, after Libertarian Party of Ill. v. Scholz, 872 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 2017),
the “full-slate” requirement was ruled unconstitutional.
90. Patton, at 22-23. The appellate court did not discuss Dr. Patton’s past
affiliation with the Republican Party and, instead, applied the “rule” of
Rosenzweig and Schmidt. Id.
91. See Joseph Bustos, Hal Patton Files to Run for State Senate as ThirdParty Candidate, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (June 25, 2018),
www.bnd.com/news/local/article213791039.html (describing how Dr. Hal
Patton filed nominating petitions as a “new party” candidate named the
“Downstate United” party); Joseph Bustos, He was kicked off the ballot, so he’s
starting his own party to run for State Senate, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT
(Apr. 10, 2018), www.bnd.com/news/local/article208366404.html (describing
the start to Dr. Patton’s process to circulate petitions as a “new party”
candidate); Dan Brannan, Hal Patton Seeks 5,000 Signatures to Refile as New
Party Illinois Senate Candidate, RIVERBENDER.COM (June 16, 2018),
www.riverbender.com/articles/details/hal-patton-seeks-5000-signatures-torefile-as-new-party-illinois-senate-candidate-29113.cfm (describing the effort of
Dr. Patton to collect and file nominating petitions in order to form a “new”
political party as a result of the appellate court’s order).
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would likely be unchallenged in the General Election. Thus, instead
of party operatives voting or seeking candidacy in the opposing
party’s primary, this form of “party-raiding” utilizes the partyswitching restrictions to eliminate viable opposition. This is exactly
what the party-switching and party affiliation laws were designed
to protect against.

IV. A WAY FORWARD: INTENT-BASED POLITICAL PARTY
AFFILIATION
Given the growing ambiguity in how individuals self-identify
and “affiliate” with political parties, perhaps a way to avoid the
result in Patton is to evaluate a question of political party affiliation
similar to a question of a candidate’s residency – one based on
intent.
Similar to the Illinois Supreme Court case Maksym v. Bd. of
Election Com'rs of City of Chicago,92 where party affiliation can be
viewed as something a person first can “establish” and then can only
change when the first affiliation is “abandoned.”93 This would be
akin to past precedent evaluating of party affiliation (and residency)
through one’s past acts.94
If based more on a totality of the circumstances, or even based
on various sworn declarations of affiliation, the current Illinois
political affiliation laws would function in accordance with their
purpose. In line with Section 7-43 of the Illinois Election Code, a
person’s voting history could be seen as form of sworn declarations
of current party affiliation.95 Similarly, a potential candidate’s
Statement of Candidacy, which is a sworn, public declaration,
constitutes an expression of party affiliation upon its filing.96 These
acts could be used to either help “establish” party affiliation or
92. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Com'rs of City of Chi., 242 Ill. 2d 303 (2011).
93. See Id. at 319 (explaining that both the establishment and the
abandonment of a residence is principally a question of intent, “Intent is
gathered primarily from the acts of a person”).
94. See Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 567 (1907) (Carter, J., dissenting)
(concurring with the conclusion reached by the court with respect to testing
party affiliation by comparing judging party affiliation with residency); See also
Cullerton, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 997 (looking backwards at a potential candidates
past acts, i.e., voting in a primary, to evaluate party affiliation).
95. See Rudd, 2016 IL App (2d) 160649, ¶ 3 (explaining that “Illinois has an
open primary system, which means that voters do not have to register with their
party affiliation and may vote in either party's primary. Voters, however, must
choose which party's ballot they will vote in the primary, and whichever ballot
they choose is a matter of public record because it is considered a declaration of
the voter's current party affiliation”); see also Kusper, 414 U.S. at 68 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing the interplay of Section 7-43, 7-44, and
7-45 of the Illinois Election Code and the emphasis on a primary voter’s
declaration of party affiliation at the primary election itself).
96. Rudd, 2016 IL App (2d) 160649, ¶ 11 (citing Morrison v. Colley, 467 F.3d
503, 510 (6th Cir. 2006)).
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signify “abandonment” for some other political party.
Such a legislative scheme would only require minor changes to
Sections 7-10 and 8-8 of the Illinois Election Code in order to clarify
the current petition signer and candidate restriction language. The
result would be a more just application of party-affiliation rules that
will better reflect the true nature of the public perception of political
party affiliation.
V. CONCLUSION
So, what does it mean to be “affiliated” with a political party?
The answer, according to current Illinois law means many things
and holds one act, for example, of signing a nominating petition, as
the conclusive act of affiliation despite one’s entire history showing
affiliation to one particular political party. The result, as the Patton
case demonstrates, is patently unfair, confusing, and overall fails to
truly protect political parties from traditional “party-raiding”
tactics. Instead, the current law has been judicially formed and
politically utilized to effectuate a form of “reverse party-raiding” to
meddle in the affairs of the opposite political parties, in an attempt
to increase the changes for the meddling-party’s candidate to be
successfully elected at the general election.
The current state of the law is unsustainable and requires
action. The basic, fundamental right to vote, tied to one’s right to
affiliate with the political party of one’s choice and to seek candidacy
for elective office, remains a matter of judicial interpretation. The
legislative and judicial impediments to seeking office or otherwise
participating in the political, nominating process in Illinois, make
Illinois particularly stand out as problematic in this area.
While such a legislative fix should be relatively easy and not
overly partisan, the likelihood of any real action in the near future
is, unfortunately, generally unlikely. Until legislatively solved,
candidates, voters, and petition signers must all be on guard so that
their own kindness or lack of knowledge of the Illinois Election Code
does not cause an inadvertent disqualification. The hope, still, is
that these laws and their judicial interpretations do not serve to
overly burden or diminish political and electoral participation and
some sense can be restored so that the law simultaneously upholds
the democratic ideals within political party participation while
considering the reality and perception of political party affiliation
in general.
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APPENDIX A
Table 197
Pre- “Kusper” Version
Former §7–10 of the Election Code
(relevant portions only):

Current Version
Current §7–10 of the Election Code
(relevant portions only):

We, the undersigned, members of and
affiliated with the …. party and
qualified primary electors of the ….
party, in the …. of …., in the county of
…. and State of Illinois, do hereby
petition that the following named
person or persons shall be a candidate
or candidates of the …. party for the
nomination for (or in case of
committeemen for election to) the office
or offices hereinafter specified, to be
voted for at the primary election to be
held on the …. day of ….

We, the undersigned, members of and
affiliated with the .... party and
qualified primary electors of the ....
party, in the .... of ...., in the county of
.... and State of Illinois, do hereby
petition that the following named
person or persons shall be a candidate
or candidates of the .... party for the
nomination for (or in case of
committeemen for election to) the
office or offices hereinafter specified,
to be voted for at the primary election
to be held on (insert date). . . .

Each petition must include as a part
thereof, a statement of candidacy for
each of the candidates filing, or in
whose behalf the petition is filed. This
statement shall set out the address of
such candidate, the office for which he
is a candidate, shall state that the
candidate is a qualified primary voter
of the party to which the petition
relates and is qualified for the office
specified . . . .

Each petition must include as a part
thereof, a statement of candidacy for
each of the candidates filing, or in
whose behalf the petition is filed. This
statement shall set out the address of
such candidate, the office for which he
is a candidate, shall state that the
candidate is a qualified primary voter
of the party to which the petition
relates and is qualified for the office
specified . . . .

For the purpose of determining
eligibility to sign a petition for
nomination or eligibility to be a
candidate under this Article, a
“qualified primary elector” of a party
(1) is an elector who has not requested
a primary ballot of any other party at a
primary election held within 2 years of
the date on which the petition must be
filed or (2) is a first-time voter in this
State registered since the last primary

A “qualified primary elector” of a
party may not sign petitions for or be
a candidate in the primary of more
than one party.99

97. It is also noteworthy that certain portions of the Illinois Election Code
have not been “updated” to eliminate the 23-month switching restriction – or
still has some explicit vestige of same. See e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-45 (2018)
(providing a form affidavit for a person seeking to vote at a primary, but who is
challenged, to sign and submit to the primary election judges, which includes,
inter alia, the statement that “had I have not voted at a primary of another
political party within a period of 23 calendar months prior to the calendar
month in which this primary is being held” and that “I have not signed the
petition for nomination of a candidate of a political party with which I am not
affiliate”).
99. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-10 (2018).
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of an even numbered year preceding
the date on which the petition must be
filed, but no such person may sign
petitions for or be a candidate in the
primary of more than one party.
However, in the case of the first
primary following the election at which
a party first qualifies as a “political
party”, as defined in Section 7–2, a
“qualified primary elector” of such
party is an elector who has not
requested a primary ballot of any other
party at any primary election held
within 2 years of the date on which the
petition must be filed.98
Former §7–43 of the Election Code:

Current §7–43 of the Election Code:

Every person having resided in this
State 6 months and in the precinct 30
days next preceding any primary
therein who shall be a citizen of the
United States of the age of 18 or more
years, shall be entitled to vote at such
primary.
The following regulations shall be
applicable to primaries:
No person shall be entitled to vote at a
primary
(a) Unless he declares his party
affiliations as required by this Article
(b) Who shall have signed the petition
for nomination of a candidate of any
party with which he does not affiliate,
when such candidate is to be voted for
at the primary.
(c) Who shall have signed the
nominating papers of an independent
candidate for any office for which office
candidates for nomination are to be
voted for at such primary.
(c.5) If that person has participated in
the town political party caucus, under
Section 45–50 of the Township Code,1
of another political party by signing an
affidavit of voters attending the caucus
within 45 days before the first day of
the calendar month in which the
primary is held.
(d) If he has voted at a primary held
under this Article 7 of another political
party within a period of 23 calendar
months next preceding the calendar
month in which such primary is held:
Provided, participation by a primary
elector in a primary of a political party

Every person having resided in this
State 6 months and in the precinct 30
days next preceding any primary
therein who shall be a citizen of the
United States of the age of 18 or more
years shall be entitled to vote at such
primary.
The following regulations shall be
applicable to primaries:
No person shall be entitled to vote at
a primary:
(a) Unless he declares his party
affiliations as required by this Article.
(b) (Blank).
(c) (Blank).
(c.5) If that person has participated in
the town political party caucus, under
Section 45-50 of the Township Code,
of another political party by signing
an affidavit of voters attending the
caucus within 45 days before the first
day of the calendar month in which
the primary is held.
(d) (Blank).
In cities, villages and incorporated
towns having a board of election
commissioners only voters registered
as provided by Article 6 of this Act
shall be entitled to vote at such
primary.
No person shall be entitled to vote at
a primary unless he is registered
under the provisions of Articles 4, 5 or
6 of this Act,3 when his registration is
required by any of said Articles to
entitle him to vote at the election with

98. P.A. 86-786, § 5, eff. Sept. 6, 1989 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/7-10 (2018)) (emphasis added for comparison effect).
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which, under the provisions of Section
7–2 of this Article, is a political party
within a city, village or incorporated
town or town only and entitled
hereunder to make nominations of
candidates for city, village or
incorporated town or town offices only,
and for no other office or offices, shall
not disqualify such primary elector
from participating in other primaries of
his party: And, provided, that no
qualified voter shall be precluded from
participating in the primary of any
purely city, village or incorporated
town or town political party under the
provisions of Section 7–2 of this Article
by reason of such voter having voted at
the primary of another political party
within a period of 23 calendar months
next preceding the calendar month in
which he seeks to participate is held.
(e) In cities, villages and incorporated
towns having a board of election
commissioners only voters registered
as provided by Article 6 of this Act 2
shall be entitled to vote at such
primary.
(f) No person shall be entitled to vote at
a primary unless he is registered under
the provisions of Articles 4, 5 or 6 of
this Act,3 when his registration is
required by any of said Articles to
entitle him to vote at the election with
reference to which the primary is
held.100
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reference to which the primary is
held.
A person (i) who filed a statement of
candidacy for a partisan office as a
qualified primary voter of an
established political party or (ii) who
voted the ballot of an established
political party at a general primary
election may not file a statement of
candidacy as a candidate of a different
established political party or as an
independent candidate for a partisan
office to be filled at the general
election immediately following the
general primary for which the person
filed the statement or voted the ballot.
A person may file a statement of
candidacy for a partisan office as a
qualified primary voter of an
established political party regardless
of any prior filing of candidacy for a
partisan office or voting the ballot of
an established political party at any
prior election.101

100. P.A. 89-331, § 3, eff. Aug. 17, 1995 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-43 (2018)).
101. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-43 (2018).
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APPENDIX B
For the purpose of determining eligibility to sign a petition for
nomination or eligibility to be a candidate under this Article, A
‘qualified primary elector’ of a party (1) is an elector who has not
requested a primary ballot of any other party at a primary election
held within 2 years of the date on which the petition must be filed or
(2) is a first-time voter in this State registered since the last primary
of an even-numbered year preceding the date on which the petition
must be filed, but no such person may not sign petitions for or be a
candidate in the primary of more than one party.102

This portion of Section 8-8 or Section 7-10 of the Election Code
has not been changed since 1990.
Next, in 2007 the General Assembly amended Section 7-43 of
the Illinois Election Code, which once placed explicit restrictions on
primary voter eligibility, with respect to voting in the primary or
signing nominating petitions for different political parties, by
eliminating any party-switching restrictions from the definition of
who is eligible to vote in a primary election, to wit:
§ 7–43. . . .
The following regulations shall be applicable to primaries:
No person shall be entitled to vote at a primary:
(a) Unless he declares his party affiliations as required by this Article.
(b) (Blank.) Who shall have signed the petition for nomination of a
candidate of any party with which he does not affiliate, when such
candidate is to be voted for at the primary.
(c) (Blank.) Who shall have signed the nominating papers of an
independent candidate for any office for which office candidates for
nomination are to be voted for at such primary.
...
(d) (Blank.) If he has voted at a primary held under this Article 7 of
another political party within a period of 23 calendar months next
preceding the calendar month in which such primary is held:
Provided, participation by a primary elector in a primary of a political
party which, under the provisions of Section 7–2 of this Article, is a
political party within a city, village or incorporated town or town only
and entitled hereunder to make nominations of candidates for city,
village or incorporated town or town offices only, and for no other
office or offices, shall not disqualify such primary elector from
participating in other primaries of his party: And, provided, that no
qualified voter shall be precluded from participating in the primary

102. P.A. 86-1348, § 2, eff. Sept. 7, 1990 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-10 (2018)) (showing the legislative deletions, with strike-outs and the
remaining text in bold); see also Cullerton, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 994 (detailing the
history and passage of Public Act 86-1348).
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of any purely city, village or incorporated town or town political party
under the provisions of Section 7–2 of this Article by reason of such
voter having voted at the primary of another political party within a
period of 23 calendar months next preceding the calendar month in
which he seeks to participate is held.103

103. P.A. 95-699, § 5, eff. Nov. 9, 2007 (current version at 10 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-43 (2018)) (showing the legislative deletions, with strike-outs, and
additions, in bold, made to Section 7-43 that have not been restored in any
current version of this section).

